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Effectiveness of market-level biosecurity at reducing exposure of poultry and humans to 
avian influenza: a systematic review and meta-analysis 
Brief: 
This meta-analysis estimated effects of market-level risk factors on AI infection in poultry and 
humans. Strategies need be targeting to larger LBMs at non-central city areas, selling and 
slaughtering multiple poultry species, market workers involved in cleaning and poultry 
processing. 
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ABSTRACT 
Background: In this study, we aimed to identify the effect of market-level risk factors on avian 
influenza (AI) infection in poultry and humans and generate evidence that will inform AI 
prevention and control programs at live bird markets (LBMs). 
Methods: We performed a systematic literature review in both English and Chinese search 
engines. We estimated the pooled odds ratios of biosecurity indicators relating to AI infections at 
market level using a quality effects (QE) meta-analysis model. 
Results: Biosecurity measures effective at reducing AI market contamination and poultry 
infection at LBMs include smaller market size, selling single poultry species and separating 
different species, performing cleaning and disinfection and market closures, ban on overnight 
storage and sourcing poultry from local areas. Our meta-analysis indicates that higher risk of 
exposure to AI infection occurs in workers at retail LBMs, female workers and those who contact 
ducks, conduct cleaning, slaughtering, defeathering or evisceration. 
Conclusion: The most effective strategies to reduce AI market contamination identified in this 
study should target larger LBMs that are located at non-central city areas, sell and slaughter 
multi-species of live poultry. LBM workers directly involved in cleaning and poultry processing 
tasks should participate in occupational health and safety programmes. 
 
Keywords: Avian influenza; live bird markets; risk factors; biosecurity; systematic review; meta-
analysis 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past ten years, several Asian-lineage HPAI viruses produced fatal disease in poultry, wild 
birds, humans and other mammals, and some have spread across three continents [1]. Affected 
countries and the international community have mobilized funds to assist in the control of the 
disease because of the potential of these viruses to develop into a global influenza pandemic [2, 
3]. 
Available evidence indicates that live bird markets (LBMs) can serve as potential hubs where AI 
viruses are maintained and transmitted for long periods of time. After the emergence of HPAI 
H5N1 influenza in 2003, several studies have documented that LBMs could be sources of human 
AI infections [4]. The importance of LBMs in the transmission of AI to humans was also 
highlighted by the emergence of influenza A (H7N9) viruses of low pathogenicity to poultry in 
early 2013, causing human infections without preceding or concomitant outbreaks in poultry. 
Exposure to H7N9 infected poultry at LBMs has been implicated as the main risk factor for 
human infection [5]. During the fifth wave of influenza A (H7N9) from October 2016 to April 
2017, an increasing proportion of human cases were related to poultry exposures in rural farms 
and backyard flocks [6]. 
In the context of animal health, biosecurity is the application of management practices that aim to 
reduce the risk of the introduction and spread of disease agents within and between animal 
populations. At LBMs, these practices can include introducing rest days, limiting the number of 
poultry species sold at a market, the use of cleanable cages and the deployment of adequate 
cleaning and disinfection procedures. While some studies have demonstrated that biosecurity 
practices at LBM-level are associated with reduced risk of AI infection, the relative efficacy of 
different LBM biosecurity practices at reducing the transmission of AI to both humans and 
poultry in the LBM setting is still unclear. 
The role of farm-level biosecurity indicators, such as production, management, environment and 
biological factors in AI infection in poultry have been quantified in a recent study [7]. A recent 
systematic review and meta-analysis evaluated risk factors for clinical outcomes in H5N1 patients 
[8]. There were also systematic reviews of pathways of AI exposure at the animal-human 
interface and meta-analyses estimated the prevalence of AI infection among humans and birds 
[9]. A previous systematic review assessed the impact of different interventions implemented in 
LBMs to control the infection of zoonotic influenza [10]. There is a need for similar studies to 
quantify the impact of relative efficacy of biosecurity measures on human (market workers) and 
poultry infection at LBMs. This information will allow national AI control program managers to 
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make informed decisions on targeted risk-reduction strategies at LBMs and in this way to protect 
poultry, poultry workers and consumers visiting LBMs. 
In this study, we systematically reviewed and meta-analysed the overall effect of different 
biosecurity indicators on AI infection from different studies, to understand more about how each 
risk factor influences AI infection at market level and to generate evidence that will inform AI 
prevention and control programs at LBMs. 
 
METHODS 
Search strategy 
Following the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) 
guidelines, we performed a systematic literature search using PubMed, ISI Web of Science and 
Science Direct, CNKI (the China Academic Journals full-text database) and WANFANG 
database (includes most comprehensive online full-text Chinese medical journals) with no starting 
time limits, up to 10 Jun 2018. The search strategy used four PICO (participants, interventions, 
comparators, and outcomes) components (Supplementary Table 1). 
 
Eligibility criteria 
Epidemiological studies were included if they evaluated biosecurity risk factors for AI infection 
in LBMs in poultry, the environment or human populations. Studies were excluded if: 1) they 
were laboratory studies, descriptive studies, case reports, and vaccine efficacy studies; 2) the 
outcome recorded was not AI infections; 3) they were not LBM based studies (i.e. ecological 
studies, studies at local, regional or national levels, studies at farm level); 4) there was no effect 
size for LBM biosecurity risk factors reported. 
 
Data abstraction for market-level biosecurity indicators 
For each of the papers that met the inclusion criteria, we recorded information on subject title, 
first author, year of publication, country, language, subtype of AIV and its pathogenicity, total 
sample size, number of AI positives and negatives, risk factors, infection type, study type and 
analysis methods. Data on biosecurity indicators were extracted by two independent reviewers 
(XZ, RSM), and a dataset based on these characteristics was created in MS Excel. In this study, 
we analysed biosecurity indicators for poultry and market environment infection and market 
workers’ infection (i.e. non-symptomatic seropositive) separately. A total of 34 biosecurity risk 
factors were explored in our study (Supplementary Table 2). For market infection, the following 
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groups of biosecurity indicators were considered: A) market characteristics: market type, market 
size, market location (rural or urban area), market location (central city or non-central city areas), 
and presence of multiple species, presence of ducks and presence of rabbits ; B) market 
biosecurity management: conduct cleaning and disinfection, before and after cleaning and 
disinfection, conduct waste disposal, conduct market closure, before and after rest day, ban on 
overnight storage, poultry sources, separate different species and conduct slaughter in market; C) 
seasonality, temperature. For market workers’ infection: D) socio-demographic characteristics: 
sex, age, years working in LBMs, type of market (wholesale or retail), vaccination history and 
occupation; E) activities involving exposure to poultry: conduct cleaning, conduct feeding, 
contact poultry, conduct slaughtering, defeathering and evisceration. 
 
Study quality and bias assessment 
Two authors (XZ, RJSM) independently reviewed and assessed the quality of each English paper 
using a structured approach. Papers in Chinese were translated by XZ and evaluated by XZ and 
RJSM. The quality of each study was scored on seven quality assessment criteria (Supplementary 
Table 3). Studies that recorded a higher overall score were considered to superior quality. The 
scores from quality assessment were then rescaled into quality ranks between 0 and 1 by making 
them relative to the highest scoring study in the group; then the best study was ranked 1 and those 
with lower scores were ranked lower. These ranks were then utilized by the quality effects model 
to adjust estimates of effect [11].  
 
Statistical Analyses 
The odds ratio (OR) and 95% confidential interval of each biosecurity factor were extracted from 
each study, or if the odds ratio was not reported, we calculated it using Epi Info TM 7.1.5.2 based 
on the raw data reported. When a factor was tested in both a univariable and multivariable model, 
the effect size of the factor in the multivariable model was used. The odds ratios of each factor 
were modelled by applying a quality effects (QE) meta-analysis model that assumed 
heterogeneity across the included studies [11]. The results of the analyses were statistically 
significant if the 95% confidence interval did not include the value one. 
The QE model redistribution of weights due to the rescaled quality rank (called Qi in the MetaXL 
software described below) helps reduce estimator variance as well as allows for proper error 
estimation through the confidence interval thus generated. Nevertheless, the random effects 
results are in Supplementary Figure 1-5 for comparison. All results are presented as a forest plot 
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that shows individual OR estimates for each group of biosecurity indicators and overall for the 
category. We assessed study heterogeneity by the Cochran Q Chi-square test, and this is also used 
by the I
2
 index statistic to estimate the proportion of total variation due to heterogeneity. An I
2
 
value of <25% indicated low heterogeneity, 25-75% indicated moderate, and a score of >=75% 
suggested high degree of heterogeneity. Publication bias was assessed using Doi and funnel plots. 
All analyses were conducted using MetaXL, version 5, Epigear International, Sunrise Beach, 
QLD, Australia (www.epigear.com).  
 
RESULTS 
Search results and study characteristics 
Our literature search strategy yielded a total of 249 citations by searching PubMed, 554 articles 
from Web of Science (Web of Science
TM
 Core Collection and MEDLINE) and 111 articles from 
Science Direct; we also found 269 articles from CNKI and 266 articles from the WANFANG 
database (Figure 1). After removing duplicates, and applying inclusion and exclusion criteria, we 
finally included 79 articles for the systematic review and meta-analysis.  
The 79 studies included in the analysis were published between 2003 and 2018. The studies were 
from seven countries or regions including China mainland (65), China Hong Kong SAR (2), 
Vietnam (4), Bangladesh (4), the USA (3), Egypt (1) and Indonesia (1). Of the included 79 studies, 
25 were in English and 54 were in Chinese; 69 studies investigated biosecurity indicators associated 
with market infection, 12 studies investigated biosecurity indicators associated with market 
workers’ infection at LBMs, out of that, two studies investigated on both poultry and poultry worker 
infections at LBMs (see Table 1).  
 
Quality and heterogeneity of selected studies 
Quality assessments of studies included in the analysis is in Supplementary Tables 4 and 5. The 
quality scores of studies related to market infections ranged from 3 to 12 (median is 8, maximum 
possible is 13), and the scores of studies on market workers’ infection ranged from 4 to 12 
(median is 8, maximum possible is 13). 
Our results indicate that overall studies within biosecurity Groups A, B, C were highly 
heterogeneous (estimated I
2
 values of 90%, 89% and 96% respectively) (se e Figure 2, Figure 3, 
Figure 4). Moderate heterogeneity was seen within Group D (I2 values of 73%, see Figure 5). 
Very low heterogeneity was seen within Group E (I2 value of 15%) (see Figure 6). Of the 79 
studies on market infections, there were 60 longitudinal studies, 17 cross-sectional studies, and 
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two case-control studies. A total of 32 studies investigated general AIV and specific subtypes (i.e. 
H5 or H7 or H9, or their combinations), 23 studies investigated specific AIV subtypes, and 14 
studies only studied general AIV. Given the heterogeneity of these studies in relation to the 
viruses being isolated, the focus of the papers was to report the effect of market-level of 
biosecurity on AI infection/recovery generally. Of all the 69 studies on market infections, 50 
studies investigated only environmental samples in LBMs for AI virus, and 11 studies collected 
only poultry samples. Eight studies investigated both poultry and environmental samples, and 
only one study reported the results by sample type. For these reasons, we did not stratify our 
meta-analysis by type of biological sample (see Table 1). Among the 69 studies on risk factors of 
AI market infection, 64 studies used RT-PCR to detect the AI virus, only five studies conducted 
virus isolations. 
 
Meta-analysis of the effect of LBM biosecurity indicators on AI market infection 
Market characteristics (Group A): The overall effect for optimal market characteristics 
associated with market infection was protective and statistically significant (OR=0.65, 95%CI: 
0.47-0.89) (Figure 2). LBMs of smaller size have the significantly lower risk of AI infection 
compared to those of larger size (OR=0.55, 95% CI: 0.34-0.88), and the presence of single 
poultry species in the LBM have lower risk of AI infection compared to LBMs with multiple 
species (OR=0.29, 95% CI: 0.11-0.76). Presence of rabbits and presence of ducks are risk factors 
of AI infection on LBMs. LBMs that were in central city areas have significantly lower risk than 
markets located in non-central city areas (OR=0.74, 95% CI: 0.56-0.97).  
Market biosecurity management (Group B): The overall effect of market biosecurity 
management characteristics associated with market infection at LBMs was significantly 
protective (OR=0.44, 95% CI: 0.32-0.59) (Figure 3). The risk of acquiring AI infection was 
significantly lower in LBMs that practice cleaning and disinfection (OR=0.35, 95% CI: 0.17-
0.73) compared to those did not. The risk of AI infection after a rest day is significantly lower 
than infection before the rest day (OR=0.20, 95%CI: 0.11-0.38). The risk of AI infection is 
significantly lower in LBMs who ban on overnight storage compared to those did not (OR=0.50, 
95% CI: 0.29-0.86).  The risk of AI infection in LBMs that source poultry from the local area was 
significantly lower than LBMs that source poultry from other areas (OR=0.57, 95%CI: 0.35-
0.94). Markets that separate different species have lower risks compare to those who did not 
(OR=0.63, 95%CI: 0.43-0.90). Markets that do not slaughter poultry onsite have lower risk than 
markets that slaughter onsite although it is not statistically significant (OR=0.54, 95% CI: 0.13-
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2.25). 
Seasonality (Group C): The overall effect of optimal seasonal indicators associated with market 
infection was protective but not statistically significant (OR=0.98, 95% CI: 0.78-1.23) (Figure 4). 
Summer and autumn months pose a significant lower risk compared to spring and winter seasons 
(OR=0.65, 95%CI: 0.44-0.96).  
 
 
Meta-analysis of the effect of LBM biosecurity indicators on poultry workers’ AI infection  
Socio-demographic characteristics (Group D): The results indicate the human AI infection at 
LBMs was significantly lower in male workers than for female workers (OR=0.68, 95%CI: 0.54-
0.87) and significantly lower in wholesale markets compared to retail markets (OR=0.38, 95%CI: 
0.22-0.65). Market workers who did not sell poultry had lower risk of getting AI infection than 
those who sell poultry (OR=0.70, 95% CI: 0.50-0.97). 
Activities involving exposure to poultry (Group E): The overall effect of optimal exposure 
behaviors was significantly protective (OR=0.37, 95%CI: 0.27-0.51) (Figure 6). Our results 
revealed a significantly lower risk of AI infection in market workers who did not conduct 
cleaning of feed trays (OR=0.34, 95% CI: 0.13-0.90) and who did not contact ducks (OR=0.28, 
95% CI: 0.12-0.64) compare with those that did. Market workers who did not slaughter poultry 
(OR=0.12, 95% CI: 0.03-0.56), did not defeather poultry (OR=0.19, 95% CI: 0.07-0.51), and who 
were not involved in poultry evisceration (OR=0.19, 95% CI: 0.07-0.52) had significant lower 
risk of getting AI infections. 
In addition to the risk factors reported above, there were several other different factors, which 
were assessed only by a single study (Supplementary Tables 6-10). These are not discussed due to 
the difficulty in interpreting the combined effect of these factors based on the small number of 
studies.  
 
Publication bias assessment 
The Funnel and Doi plots (see Supplementary Figure 6 and 7) demonstrated major negative 
asymmetry of effects for market characteristics and socio-demographic characteristics only. This 
is due to the heterogeneity of subgroups that belong to these two categories, although a paucity of 
negative studies cannot be excluded thus leading to an exaggerated protective effect for factors in 
these categories. 
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DISCUSSION 
LBMs are recognized to be reservoirs of AI viruses and a possible source of infection for both 
domestic poultry and humans working in or visiting them [12-15]. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first meta-analysis of evidence on the effectiveness of market-level biosecurity in both 
poultry and human AI infections at LBMs. Our analysis of the relevant published English and 
Chinese research articles provided strong evidence in favour of biosecurity operations at LBMs 
that are protective for AI infections on both poultry and human infections at LBMs.  
Our meta-analysis demonstrates that the odds of detecting AI viruses at LBMs is dependent on a 
select group of LBM biosecurity characteristics and management measures. Our finding that the 
presence of multiple poultry species, and presence of rabbits or ducks increased the risk of AI 
circulation in the LBM, compared to those with single species, can partly be explained by unsafe 
poultry movements by some traders. A previous study suggested that live poultry traders who sell 
more than one species are more likely to import birds from multiple sources and may also supply 
high risk species, e.g. wild animals or birds, without inspection or health checks [16]. LBMs that 
are located in central city areas have lower risk than those i  non-central city areas, this may due 
to the enhanced LBM management measures in the central city areas (e.g. enhanced clean and 
disinfection, quarantine etc.) [17] and the massive trade and complex poultry source in the non-
central city areas [18]. This suggests the risk of AI virus spread from the non-central areas to the 
central areas, therefore, enhanced regulations should be emphasized in the non-central city areas. 
Cleaning and disinfection procedures are considered to be an important strategy to reduce disease 
transmission in LBMs, and our meta-analysis of existing evidence supports this view [16, 19]. In 
addition, our results revealed that the detection of AI viruses was always less right after market 
rest days when infectious load is less [20-26]. Closing LBMs can largely eliminate human 
infection risk [27].  However, studies indicated that recovery of AI viruses can occur shortly after 
LBMs re-open, presumably following the introduction of AI positive birds [28, 29]. Our study 
indicates that the combined effect of daily cleaning and disinfection and waste removal are 
effective ways of reducing AI transmission at LBMs [19, 30, 31]. We also found that LBMs that 
trade poultry from local areas have lower risk of AI infection compared with those that trade 
poultry sourced from other areas. Previous research indicates that poultry movements facilitate 
the transmission and spread of AI viruses between premises as a result of mixing of poultry from 
different sources and the increased opportunity for virus multiplication during transport [19]. The 
risk of AI transmission at LBMs posed by cross-regional and long-distance poultry movements 
could be managed by implementing a market-level traceability system that includes certification 
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of sources of poultry based on their compliance with biosecurity requirements. We found that the 
risk of AI infection in markets that do not slaughter poultry onsite was lower compared to 
markets that slaughter poultry onsite [31, 32]. This suggests that poultry slaughter operations at 
LBMs increases the risk of AI transmission within the LBM environment presumably because of 
exposure to aerosols arising during the slaughter process where AI virus may be present in large 
quantities. Improvement of slaughtering and poultry processing operations at LBMs should be an 
area of investment from market operators through the implementation of standard operating 
procedures and good manufacturing practices that comply with standard health and safety 
regulations. 
Our previous studies in southern China demonstrated that temporal variation in the intensity of 
poultry trade and production quantity of live poultry around the Chinese New Year festivities is 
associated with higher HPAIV H5N1 infection risk in humans and poultry. Our meta-analysis 
suggested that spring and winter seasons posed significant higher risk of AI infection in the LBM 
environment compared to summer and autumn [33-39]. This seasonality effect is due, in part, to 
the fact that lower temperature and humidity can increase virus survival in the environment [4]. 
These findings demonstrate the need for heightened seasonal targeted surveillance at LBMs to 
maximize effectiveness. 
Our results demonstrate that human infection at LBMs is dependent on important demographic 
and occupational hazard. The risk of human infection is higher in retail markets compared to 
wholesale markets can partly be explained by differences in poultry handling operations within 
the two types of LBMs [40-42]. On one hand, wholesale markets are usually hubs in the poultry 
market chain where live poultry consignments from different farms congregate before sent to 
other locations, typically retail markets and less frequently slaughterhouses. Poultry handling 
activities in wholesale markets are limited compared to retail markets in that poultry remain in 
their cages or assigned area until they are loaded onto trucks on their way to retail markets. One 
study had noted that live poultry were slaughtered at retail LBMs daily, while many wholesale 
markets do not slaughter or have separate slaughter areas [43]. On the other hand, retail markets 
constitute the last step in the LBM chain providing more time for virus to spread and multiply.  
Furthermore, our meta-analyses indicate that activities that directly expose LBM workers to AI 
such as slaughtering, defeathering and cleaning significantly increase the risk of workers AI 
infection [44-46]. These results are in line with previous observations that the risk of AI infection 
is greater in LBM workers who clean water containers [23] and those that conduct poultry 
evisceration with very limited personal protection measures [47]. Several studies have 
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demonstrated that most commonly contaminated sites were located in the poultry slaughtering 
zone [22, 31]. There is recent evidence on detection of influenza virus in air samples from LBMs, 
especially with defeathering machines, and risk of airborne transmission [48]. These are all 
poultry handling activities primarily observed in retail markets which further highlights the need 
for workers to wear personal protective equipment within retail LBMs.  
There are important gender disparities between wholesale and retail markets because wholesale 
markets tend to be male dominated as opposed to retail markets where women share the poultry 
value chain with men. Interestingly our results indicate that female workers are at increased risk 
of AI infection compared to male workers [40, 46, 49]. This contrasts with the situation for H7N9 
influenza in humans in the general population where older males are at greater risk than younger 
females [40]. These results may also reflect gender differentiation in tasks within LBMs, which 
put female workers at greater risk of AI infection compared to males. Future biosecurity strategies 
should account for gender differences in risk identified in our study, which could include raising 
KAPs through information platforms that target women working at LBMs. 
Interpretation of the findings of our study should be done in consideration with its limitations. 
Firstly, as with all meta-analyses, we were restricted to the data that could be obtained from 
written reports (all studies included in our meta-analyses were observational studies, given that 
randomized trials were not available). Secondly, while we meta-analysed studies from different 
countries, this may overlook the heterogeneity in different study areas, although most of them 
(almost 95%) were Asian countries. Thirdly, we grouped different types of AIV (H5, H7, H9 
etc.); we believe that there will be commonality in spread and transmission in LBMs while there 
are differences in the epidemiology among these viruses. Fourthly, the estimates presented by the 
literature reviewed in this study on the effect of sociodemographic analysis of human infection in 
LBMs were often not adjusted and none reported the interaction between variables. It is difficult 
to know how much the measured effect of biosecurity indicators could be due to confounding or 
effect modification; indeed, most effects reported in the studies are unadjusted, and on no 
occasion did studies explored the presence of effect modification between factors. Lastly, we 
conducted the quality assessment including several study characteristics assuming study quality 
on a continuous scale and this may not be necessarily the case, and our list of criteria is somewhat 
arbitrary therefore we also put the results from the random effect model in the supplementary file. 
In conclusion, to minimise market contamination and poultry infection of AI at LBMs, control 
measures should be targeted to markets that sell and slaughter live poultry and markets with 
presence of multiple species. Strategies that include daily cleaning and disinfection, regular 
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jid/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/infdis/jiy400/5050226
by University of Queensland Library user
on 09 July 2018
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
12 
 
market closure and waste disposal as well as an emphasis of inspection on cross-regional poultry 
movements should be put in place. Targeted surveillance programs for AI circulation in LBMs 
should focus on winter and spring months. Finally, LBM workers directly involved in market 
cleaning and poultry processing should be provided with occupational health and safety 
promotion programmes, with emphasis on female workers at retail LBMs. 
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Figure  
Figure 1 Flow diagram of studies selection process. 
Figure 2 Forest plots of risk estimates of market characteristics (Group A) on avian influenza 
market infection. Note: * The OR values have significant significance (P<0.05) 
Figure 3 Forest plots of risk estimates of market biosecurity management (Group B) on avian 
influenza market infection. Note: * The OR values have significant significance (P<0.05) 
Figure 4 Forest plots of risk estimates of seasonality (Group C) on AI market infection. Note: * 
The OR values have significant significance (P<0.05) 
Figure 5 Forest plots of risk estimates of socio-demographic characteristics (Group D) on Human 
avian influenza infection. Note: * The OR values have significant significance (P<0.05) 
Figure 6 Forest plots of risk estimates of activities involving exposure to poultry (Group E) on 
Human avian influenza infection. Note: * The OR values have significant significance (P<0.05) 
Table  
Table 1 General characteristics of the included studies regarding biosecurity indicators of avian 
influenza infections at live bird markets. 
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Table 1 General characteristics of the included studies regarding biosecurity indicators of avian influenza infections at live bird markets. 
ID 
Author, Year and 
Country 
Retrospective 
time 
AIV Subtype Type of study Market type Sampling type Analysis Methods 
Studies of biosecurity indicators related to of poultry infection 
1 Bulaga 2003, USA 2001 H7N2 
Cross-
sectional 
Retail 
Poultry and 
environmental  
Multivariate analysis 
2 Kung 2003, Hong Kong 2001 H9N2 Longitudinal Retail Poultry samples Univariate analysis 
3 Gaber 2007, USA 2004-2005 H5 or H7 Case-control Not mentioned 
Poultry and 
environmental samples 
Multivariate analysis 
4 Trock 2008, USA 2002-2003 H5 or H7 Longitudinal Not mentioned 
Poultry and 
environmental samples 
Univariate analysis 
5 Indriani 2010, Indonesia 2007-2008 H5N1 
Cross-
sectional 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Multivariate analysis 
6 LiLH 2010, China 2007-2008 AIV Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
7 Martin 2011, China 2009 H5N1 
Cross-
sectional 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry samples Multivariate analysis 
8 Leung 2012, Hong Kong 1999-2011 H9N2 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry samples Multivariate analysis 
9 ZhangRS 2012, China* 2009 H5N1 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
10 BiFY 2013, China 2010-2011 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
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11 Phan 2013, Vietnam 2011 H5N1 
Cross-
sectional 
Not mentioned Poultry samples Multivariate analysis 
12 ChenZ 2014, China 2013-2014 H7N9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry and 
environmental samples 
Univariate analysis 
13 LiuH 2014, China 2014 AIV, H5, H7, H9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
14 WangDF 2014, China 2011-2013 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal Retail Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
15 YuM 2014, China 2010-2013 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
16 YuanJ 2014, China 2014 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry and 
environmental samples 
Univariate analysis 
17 ZhuBL 2014, China 2014 H7N9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
18 ZhuJL 2014, China 2014 H7N9 cross-sectional Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
19 CuiXB 2015, China 2013 AIV, H5,H9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
20 ElMasry 2015, Egypt 2009-2014 H5N1 Longitudinal Not mentioned Poultry samples Univariate analysis 
21 HuangFJ 2015, China 2015 H7N9 
Cross-
sectional and 
case-control 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
22 KangM 2015, China 2013-2014 H7N9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
23 LiuW 2015, China 2013-2014 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
24 WangFY1 2015, China 2011-2013 AIV, H5,H9 Longitudinal Retail Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
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25 WangFY2 2015, China 2014 AIV Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
26 WuJ 2015, China 2013-2015 AIV, H7, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
27 XuGF 2015, China 2013-2014 AIV Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
28 YuanJ 2015, China 2014 AIV, H7N9 Longitudinal Retail Environmental samples Multivariate analysis 
29 ZhaoZF 2015, China 2014 AIV, H5,H9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
30 CaoL1 2016, China 2015 AIV, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
31 CaoL2 2016, China 2015 AIV, H5, H7, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
32 LiWQ 2016, China 2014-2015 H7N9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
33 LiuFR1 2016, China 2012- 2017 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
34 LiuFR2 2016, China 2015-2016 AIV,H5,H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
35 LiuJW 2016, China 2013-2015 H7N9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
36 MengJH 2016, China 2013-2015 AIV,H5,H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
37 NongXN 2016, China 2011-2015 AIV Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
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38 PengC 2016, China 2015 AIV Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
39 WangXX 2016, China 2014-2015 H7 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples 
Univariate and 
multivariate analysis 
40 XieCJ 2016, China 2014-2015 AIV,H5,H7,H9 Longitudinal Retail Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
41 ZengJJ 2016, China 2013-2015 AIV,H5,H7,H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
42 ZengL 2016, China 2015-2016 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
43 
Abu Sayeed 2017, 
Bangladesh 
2015 AIV 
Cross-
sectional 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
44 ChenC 2017, China 2016 H7N9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Multivariate analysis 
45 ChenXD 2017, China 2017 AIV, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry and 
environmental samples 
Univariate analysis 
46 Chu 2017, Vietnam 2014 AIV cross-sectional 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry samples Univariate analysis 
47 DaiYX 2017, China 2015 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
48 LiH 2017, China 2012-2015 AIV Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
49 LiLZ 2017, China 2014-2017 AIV, H5, H7, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
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50 LiuM 2017, China 2015-2016 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
51 LiuRC 2017, China 2009-2014 H5N1 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Multivariate analysis 
52 MaoXX 2017, China 2016 AIV, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry samples Univariate analysis 
53 QianLM 2017, China 2013-2015 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
54 TuZJ 2017, China 2015-2016 AIV Longitudinal Retail Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
55 YuXF 2017, China Jul-05 H5,H9 cross-sectional 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
56 ZhangHB 2017, China 2015-2016 AIV Longitudinal Wholesale Poultry samples Univariate analysis 
57 BaoJ 2018, China 2014-2015 AIV, H5,H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry samples Univariate analysis 
58 CaoL3 2018, China 2016 AIV, H5, H7, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry and 
environmental samples 
Univariate analysis 
59 CaoL4 2018, China 2017 AIV, H5 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
60 ChenYH 2018, China 2017 AIV 
Cross-
sectional 
Wholesale Poultry samples 
Univariate and 
multivariate analysis 
61 FanSY 2018, China** 2014-2016 H7N9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
62 
Hassan 2018, 
Bangladesh 
2012-2016 AIV, H5, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Poultry samples Univariate analysis 
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63 LiuXQ 2018, China 2015-2016 AIV, H5, H7, H9 Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
64 WuQ 2018, China 2015-2016 AIV, H9 Longitudinal Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
65 XuJ 2018, China 2015-2017 H5, H7, H9 Longitudinal Retail Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
66 YangJ 2018, China 2014-2015 AIV Longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Environmental samples Multivariate analysis 
67 YangY 2018, China 2017 AIV, H5, H9 
Cross-
sectional 
Not mentioned Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
68 YaoJX 2018, China 2014-2016 AIV Longitudinal Retail Environmental samples Univariate analysis 
69 ZouLB 2018, China 2012-2017 AIV Longitudinal Wholesale 
Poultry and 
environmental samples 
Univariate analysis 
Studies of biosecurity indicators related to of poultry worker's infection 
1 LiuY 2009, 2009 2007-2009 H5N1, H9N2 cross-sectional 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Market workers Univariate analysis 
2 WangM 2009, 2009 2007-2008 H5, H9 cross-sectional 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Market workers Univariate analysis 
3 ZhangRS 2012, 2012* 2009 H5N1 cross-sectional Not mentioned Market workers Univariate analysis 
4 Uyeki 2012, 2012 2001 H9 cross-sectional Not mentioned Market workers Univariate analysis 
5 Nasreen 2013, 2013 2009 H5N1 cross-sectional  
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Market workers Univariate analysis 
6 Dung 2014, 2014 2011 H5N1 cross-sectional Not mentioned Market workers Univariate analysis 
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7 TangXJ 2014, 2014 2013 H7N9 cross-sectional  retail Market workers 
Univariate and 
multivariate analysis 
8 WangX 2014, 2014 2013 H7N9 longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Market workers 
Univariate and 
multivariate analysis 
9 WangQ 2015, 2015 2008-2010 H9N2 cross-sectional Not mentioned Market workers Univariate analysis 
10 Nasreen 2015, 2015 2009-2010 H5N1 longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Market workers Univariate analysis 
11 FanSY 2018, 2018** 2014-2016 H7N9 Longitudinal retail Market workers Univariate analysis 
12 WangX 2018,  2015-2016 H7N9 longitudinal 
Both wholesale 
and retail 
Market workers 
Univariate and 
multivariate analysis 
* , **Same study 
Note: The detailed references of all the 79 included studies are cited in the Supplementary Table 4 and 5. 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. 
 
  
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jid/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/infdis/jiy400/5050226
by University of Queensland Library user
on 09 July 2018
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
30 
 
Figure 6. 
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